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calls "the politics of knowledge dissemination", the tension between the desire to enfranchise the
masses medically and the need to keep potentially dangerous knowledge in competent hands.
These chapters hardly exhaust the subject, of course. Porter's compendious introduction
acknowledges as much, but also rightly suggests that the value of this work is not simply that it
explores several new patches of territory, but that by raising many broad questions about the nature
of popularization, it "points the way towards a more comprehensive history".
James Whorton, University of Washington, Seattle
VIRGINIA BERRIDGE and PHILIP STRONG (eds), AIDS and contemporary history, Cambridge
History of Medicine series, Cambridge University Press, 1993, pp. x, 284, £35.00, $54.95
(0-521-41477-6).
Most of the papers in this valuable collection examine evidence that both precedes and is
contemporary with the HIV epidemic, despite the editors' division of the book into the "prehistory"
and the "history" of AIDS. Historians and their colleagues in adjacent disciplines will be greatly
instructed by: Jeffrey Weeks on the regulation of sexuality in Britain; Jane Lewis on British public
health doctors' long search for a role and recognition; Bridget Towers on medical screening in the
United Kingdom; Ilana Loewy on the history of the Wassermann reaction; Paul Weindling on the
use of militaristic models in international policy to control sexually transmitted diseases; William
Muraskin on responses to Hepatitis B in the United States in the 1970s and early 1980s; Virginia
Berridge on continuity in British drug policy; Warwick Anderson on the politics of needle exchange
in New York (as deduced from printed primary sources); Ewan Fairlie on district authority responses
to disease (and on the use ofmanagement theory in historical analysis); John Street on the continuing
policy salience of the epidemic in Britain; and Monika Steffen on AIDS policies in France. Janet
Foster's appendix on the "archive potential" of AIDS is a useful guide, although she ignores
electronic data about patients collected as a result of clinical investigation during the epidemic.
The only paper not mentioned above is Harden's and Rodrigues' celebratory history of research
policy at the National Institutes of Health in the United States. The authors defend their employer's
contributions to scientific progress. But they do not even foreshadow the important story: NIH
leadership in mobilizing investigators and patients for community-based trials, and the vast
expansion of women and members of minority groups among research subjects.
The authors are poorly served by a curious title, an embarrassing jacket illustration, and an opaque
introductory chapter. The title adds a third, unexplained, category to those of "prehistory" and
"history". The jacket illustration is epidemiologically incorrect; it identifies "risk groups" rather
than risky behaviour. Berridge's introduction strives for historiographic profundity without
achieving it.
Two errors require correction. Berridge erroneously claims (p. 12) that the papers on the social
impact of AIDS in a 1986 issue of the Milbank Quarterly were reprinted as a book in 1988, despite
accurate citations by many of the authors in this collection. Towers three times misidentifies
Professor Stanley Joel Reiser as Reisler.
Daniel M. Fox, Milbank Memorial Fund
MICHAEL B. TYQUIN, Gallipoli: the medical war. The Australian army medical services in the
Dardanelles campaign of 1915, Modern History series, Kensington, NSW, New South Wales
University Press, 1993, pp. xiv, 277, illus., Austral. $39.95 (0-86840-189-7).
Gallipoli-widely regarded as one of the most disastrous "sideshows" of the First World
War-occupies a special place in the collective memory of Australians. It was there, during the
eight-month abortive campaign to wrest the Dardanelles from the control of the Turks in 1915, that
some 72,000 Australians lost their lives (albeit, overwhelmingly, to enteric diseases). Michael
Tyquin's Gallipoli richly supplements the multi-volume official medical histories of the Australian
involvement in the campaign through a focus on the day-to-day experiences of the sick and injured
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Australian troops and their medical and para-medical aides. By drawing on a wealth ofunpublished
diaries, letters, and archival material, Tyquin recaptures the physical and psychological terrors
consequent upon, not just the shell fire and shrapnel, but the terrain, extremes of climate, meagre
rations, decaying teeth and broken dentures, rotting corpses, lack of sanitation, plagues of flies and,
interestingly, fears of castration at the hands ofthe Turks. That an epidemic ofself-inflicted wounds
resulted seems hardly surprising. Overall, we gain an image of the Aussie soldier which sharply
contrasts with the bronzed super-warrior regaled in Australian folklore.
Tyquin's account also undermines the vanities characteristic ofmedical men's reflections on war.
He does not belittle the efforts ofthose at Gallipoli who sought to perform their medical duties under
impossible odds, but he provides evidence, too, of cowardice, loafing and incompetence at levels
beneath that of the hapless military medical command. More central to his purpose, though, is a
reapportioning of the blame for the whole medical fiasco. He shows that, at least in part, the
Australians were themselves culpable. Not only did the medical profession bring with them all their
divisive pettyjealousies and political quarrels, but also, crucially, the Australian government (unlike
the Canadian) failed to insist on retaining control over its own army medical services, leaving all to
the British. Consequently, the Australians suffered when it came to obtaining medical equipment
and supplies, and they had no means of transcending the near-inertia effects ofthe conflict between
the British Navy and Army over who was responsible for evacuating the wounded and who for
caring for them once on board ambulance ships.
Tyquin's Gallipoli is first and foremost a contribution to Australian history. It does not aspire to
be a major contribution to the study of the relations between medicine and war; nowhere does it
engage with other work in the field-not even that on medical aspects of the First World War. Nor
does it seek to compare the medical experience ofthe Australians with that ofthe Canadians, British,
French, and others engaged in the Dardanelles campaign. However, on its own terms, it can be
criticized for failing to impart anything on the significance of what it describes for the subsequent
social and political history of medicine in Australia. Tyquin enriches our knowledge of the
Australian medical experience of Gallipoli, and he succeeds in dispelling various lingering
down-under myths. But in failing to comment on the importance ofthe event for the social relations
of medicine in Australia, he provides no reason for medical historians in Australia or elsewhere to
regard Gallipoli as other than a tragic "sideshow".
Roger Cooter, Wellcome Unit for the History of Medicine, Manchester
JERROLD M. POST, MD, and ROBERT S. ROBINS, When illness strikes the leader: the dilemma
of the captive king, New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1993, pp. xvi, 243, £19.95,
$30.00 (0-300-05683-4).
A few years ago, discussing a recent supplement to the Dictionary of national biography, a
reviewer commented that the old shibboleth of not mentioning sexual proclivities had gone, though
another remained: illness or substance abuse. An eighth of the great and the good commemorated in
that volume, he estimated, had been dependent on alcohol. Yet since Hugh L'Etang's pathbreaking
Fit to lead? all too few journal articles and books have been devoted to this theme, and these have
had a limited focus, such as the admirable in-depth study Hidden illness in the White House.
The reasons for such reticence, Jerrold M. Post and Robert S. Robins say in When illness strikes
the leader, are self-evident. The public is reluctant to accept illness in its leaders, the surrounding
staff may stand to lose much if the king-figure is toppled, while the physicians' task is particularly
difficult given the ethical codes. Such different interests may, then, collude to keep the leader in
power, an egregious example being after Woodrow Wilson's stroke, when for seven months the U.S.
government was run by a cabal composed of his wife, political aide, and physician.
As professors ofpsychiatry and political science, respectively, Post and Robins are ideally placed
to compare the medical with the political events-in beautifully crafted prose. I have only two minor
quibbles: firstly, their criticism of Eisenhower's physician for not hospitalizing him immediately
after his myocardial infarction-which may have saved his life, given what we now know about its
risks. Secondly, entertainingly, they confuse Dennis Brain, the distinguished horn player, with
Russell (later Lord) Brain, the neurologist who saw Churchill after his stroke.
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